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Thesis Abstract
For the written component of my thesis, I am attempting to make sense of a current strain
in contemporary painting which, generally speaking, tends towards reduction, humble
materiality, lack of overt, didactic critique, and a scholarly interest in outmoded or
overlooked art historical movements and figures. These are tendencies with which, as a
painter, I feel both affinities and differences. Rather than rigidly define a “movement,” I
will identify prevalent modes but also highlight individual strategies.
I will begin by outlining some of the basic, underlying problems in painting
today. I will then examine, as case studies, three young painters—Josephine Halvorson,
Richard Aldrich, and Joe Bradley—who I feel exemplify and yet in some ways transcend
this trend. I will speak about the work of each in terms of the context in which it is made.
However, part of the point of this thesis is to see how individual works by these artists
might be talked about apart from their “scene.” I will therefore examine a specific work
by each artist in terms of the visual information it is supplies. I will go on to examine
two critical reactions (and in one case a critical-fictional reaction) to this kind of work—
that of Raphael Rubenstein’s “Provisional Painting” and Christopher K. Ho’s “Hirsch
E.P. Rothko’s Hirsch E.P. Rothko”—in an attempt to assess how this type of work is
being interpreted by the critical community. Lastly, I will provide my own explanations
for why this work is being produced now, why (or if) it is relevant, and what problems it
proposes for painters in the future.
Although this is not a thesis that addresses my own work directly, it is my
intention to use the art-critical process as a means to clarify my own concerns.
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Within the last decade, some contemporary painters have turned toward
reductive abstraction and the obfuscation of available content. This might be
seen by some as a conceptual slackening, or, in some instances, a movement away
by painters from the project of institutional and canonical critique. What might it
mean that eleven years into the twenty-first century we see an explosion of artists
who are delving again into the language of formal abstraction? If it were in fact
this simple, this trend would seem to signify a rejection of the rigorous
investigation and reappraisal of the role of the artist that has characterized the
work of the previous decade. This work appears now as both wrong in terms of
any idea of “advancement” (an idea of linear progression and authorship which,
though ostensibly rejected in postmodern practice, has in fact been preserved)
and also uncomfortably decorative and passive if taken at face value. The offhand, or casual, look of the work might be read as fashionable ennui that shows a
lack of any kind of discursive stance, and in fact much of the work may
deliberately tempt this reading. The question, then, is why would an artist put
him or herself into this dubious territory? In order to make sense of this
development, it is necessary to think about what binds together bodies of work by
artists such as Richard Aldrich, Joe Bradley, and Josephine Halvorson, (who,
upon inspection, are in fact very different from one another) while resisting the
temptation to create a coherent movement where there is none.
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Not only does this new painting seem wrong in terms of its arrival on the
scene at this particular time (appearing, as it does, to not set up ambitious new
precedents for how meaning can be created through the medium) but also that,
taken as a whole, the work exists as something like an index of wrong moments, a
detailed searching-through of art history in an attempt to find moments and
personalities that upset the grand narratives of both modernist progress and
postmodernist critique. This search exists on parallel planes: it is both an
insider’s game of playing with fashion—cycling through outré moments and at a
fast clip inserting them into a context where they become newly relevant—and, at
a deeper level, a scholarly reappraisal of the canon and the creation of an
alternate narrative. The latter activity poses a question that is vital to the
understanding of this new work: if we construct an alternate lineage in painting,
what, then is the work that needs to be made now to expand upon that lineage.
The problem, of course, is that the subjectivity inherent in this activity would
seem to preclude participation in a wider dialogue. We want canons because they
allow us to make judgments and access value. Any critique of the canon is based
on the universal acceptance of a certain lineage’s historical prominence. These
new painters, however, give themselves permission not only to misuse and
reshuffle it as painters have previously done, but also to insert themselves,
unannounced, into art historical modes. This could either be seen as a vain
exercise in magical thinking, or as a creative activity that responds to a new and
inexorable paradigm, that of a vast and democratic access to a flow of
interchangeable images.
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In response, these painters feel a permission to sort through the history of
painting to look for new antecedents, finding them in forgotten movements and
persons. But they also respond to the reality that their paintings, too, will be sent
out as memes into this sea of information by making works that assert a certain
objection to this status in their emphasis on materiality and the primacy of the
viewer-work interaction. This interaction exists not as a chauvinistic projection
of artistic power from the work to the viewer, nor as a simple declaration of the
failure or “impossibility” of the work, but as a series of parallel problems: the
momentary reality of the works’ insistence on its material existence versus the
background, the constant reality of its role as an exchangeable information unit,
the idea that gestures no longer have set meanings (e.g. a painterly, gestural mark
does not necessarily equal emotive expression), and the idea of an emptiness, or
lacking, in the work that courts incredulity in the viewer that then transfers the
artists agency as maker to the viewer. Overshadowing all of this is the problem of
side-stepping, of an abdication of the critical apparatus. This work exists at a
time when, although the authoritative voice of the artist/critic has been called
into question, it still very much persists as the trusted site of meaning-making.
Can this new painting supply a different critical model? It is possible that this
move towards reduction is one which attempts both a real distillation of visual
information as a critique of the overblown, unedited, un-chosen, visual culture at
large (reduction as resistance), and, conversely, an acquiescence to multiplicity—
in showing a lag, or a lacking, inherent in the work, the artist points to the mental
agency of the viewer to complete the work. Might this represent a new communal
model of critique that resists a top-down, adversarial model? By accepting and
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using the painting’s status as a proposition, a unit of information, a meme, and
resisting that reality with signifiers of the “real” (hand-made, clunky, etc.), and
most importantly by showing work that appears almost un-credible, these artists
would seem to be either neglecting their role as artist by giving up their agency,
or, perhaps, creating the ground for a new, participatory meditation on material
facture and painting’s historical mobility.

Josephine Halvorson

Wire Clippings, 2009

There exists a tension in Halvorson’s work that is caused by the strange position
her painted marks inhabit along the spectrum of mark making. If one end of this
spectrum is the self-referential mark which maintains its independence and
autonomy, and the other end is the mark as a self-negating, invisible member of a

6

whole—as exhibited most pointedly in the tradition of trompe l’oeil painting, her
marks hang tenuously in the balance. Due to compositional tropes (such as the
placing of a depicted flat surface parallel to the picture plane, in direct
confrontation with the viewer) that owe a direct debt to such nineteenth-century
trompe l’oeil painters as John F. Peto, Halvorson’s painting cannot help but prod
the viewer into a tantalizing relationship with the objects depicted on the canvas.
The viewer is set up to desire that vertiginous satisfaction that is supplied by
trompe l’oeil space, and yet that proposal is never fully realized. The artist
refuses to entirely subjugate the mark, leaving it on the edge of complete
incorporation into the depicted thing, but always still retaining a remainder of
itself.
In Wire Clippings, Halvorson frames a painting, of sorts, within a
painting. A flat stone block sits in the middle of the canvas, edged by an
indeterminate brown plane that we might assume to be a work table. The viewer
is left to decide whether, because of the tapering of the left side of the block, he is
looking at something slightly in front of him and thus in perspective, or if he is
looking straight down, in which case the side of the block is broken at a diagonal.
There is a scattering of wire pieces spread out, seemingly placed by chance, over
the face of the block. If we understand this framed area of the block as the
“painting” space, then each clipping can be seen to represent one abstract mark,
as can the shadows, smudges, holes and dents on the block. Halvorson gives us
here a kind of menu of the ontological possibilities of mark making, but does so
only within a small range, never breaking the tension of the picture by slipping
either into complete illusionism or into surface-affirming abstraction.
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Halvorson’s game in this picture is to assert the parallel between the direct
address of trompe l’oeil and the direct address of abstraction. The obvious way to
do this would be to make a highly-rendered, but object-less trompe l’oeil that
presented gestures as nameable events (think of Tauba Auerbach’s Untitled Fold
paintings). Yet in Wire Clippings the artist obstinately refuses to play the game
she seems to propose. She resists this appealingly pat critical stance by subtly
maintaining the painting’s status as a wrought object.
What kind of a painting is this, then? In some senses it is a very
conventional one. Her touch is reminiscent of past makers of tasteful, small,
representational paintings, such as Fairfield Porter, who placed emphasis on how
painted things tremble in the area between materiality and illusionism.
Furthermore, the parameters of her project are utterly traditional—her paintings
are made from life, directly in front of the subject, on easel-sized linen canvases.
Halvorson’s paintings express a certain conservatism, not just in their reference
to “good” representational painting, but in their allusion to a type of antique
American-ness, as if every subject she paints were brought down from the attic of
a New England farmhouse. Nothing represented in her work is ever new, things
are always worn, chipped, and well-used (indeed, we are often left looking at the
remainders of activities—bread crumbs on wax paper, a stack of photo albums, a
bare, ashen, fireplace). A question arises then of what exactly is Halvorson’s
intent. Are we to read her paintings as an opportunity to focus on the overlooked,
the used-up or broken things of the world, or are we to read them as reassuring
depictions of objects unspoiled by the intrusions of commerce and power that
produce the rude aesthetic jolts of our time?
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Halvorson’s work has been read by critics as a critique of the distractions
and frenzied speed of contemporary life. Writing in The Brooklyn Rail, Litia
Perta says that “Halvorson’s work upsets this constant motion and opens up
stillness as a radical act.”1 She positions this stillness against the dominant
culture of action, of capitalist predation. A dominant role for the artist, after
Warhol, is to use the rhetorical position of the art object to ape the cheap glamour
of the mass-produced product and thus to show a complicity between the
aesthetic realm and consumer culture, linking the work’s critical content to the
speed with which it is consumed. So for Halvorson to reject this model, she
either appears as retrograde, willingly ignoring the governing facts and pace of
modern life, or as oppositional to those facts. She states herself that: “Like so
many others, I’m caught up in the speed set by the technology of daily life.
Painting, for me, has become increasingly the inverse of my day-to-day pace. It’s
a “stilling” of life, a chance to find a prolonged closeness, a thorough,
uninterrupted conversation, a stretching of my own thoughts.”2. This might seem
more like retreat than resistance if the aim and effect for both painter and viewer
were simply a reprieve from over-stimulation, if what we encountered in this
“stillness” was not at all difficult. But Halvorson uses nostalgia as a tool to access
difficulty.
There are two nostalgias at work in Halvorson’s painting. The first is
nostalgia for a certain type of place, temperature, or scent. Using the slightest

1
2

Litia Perta, “Josephine Halvorson,” The Brooklyn Rail, December 2008 – January 2009.
Josephine Halvorson, interview by Firelai Báez for the exhibit, “Americanana,” Hunter College, 2010
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means, she implies a world (in the Heideggarian sense of the word3), a context.
This world is that of frugal effort, practicality, solitary work, and sober clarity.
Our physical associations with material, how things feel to the touch, are used to
guide us into these ideas. We “feel” the cool of the stone which is pocked with
dents from small hand tools and yet smooth and rounded. We “lift” its weight—
disproportionally heavy to its size. We notice the rough, weathered wood
underneath. We are in an old milk barn (now used as a workshop) in the early
hours of the morning, mending a broken clasp. It is cold and a bit damp. And
yet, maybe we aren’t the cause of this scattering of material. Perhaps there is a
further displacement, or further gap, between the time of the action (the clipping
of wire) and the time of the fictional “finding” of the scene. This creates a double
loss, or double nostalgia, between ourselves as viewers and the fictional viewer,
and from that viewer to the original actor.
All of this would seem like the worst sort of conjecture, a romantic reading
of the work, were it not for the fact the Halvorson decidedly goads this sort of
thinking with the specificity of the material which she depicts, and cuts us off
from any satisfyingly determinate identity of subject. She provides an
atmospheric specificity instead of a textual specificity.
But Halvorson’s nostalgia is twofold, not only recalling a frank, folksy
atmosphere, but also referencing the lineage of modernist abstract painting. A
direct corollary can be drawn between the residue of the activity depicted in Wire
Clippings and the idea of the abstract painting as residue, as the leftovers of a

3

Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought trans. Albert
Hoftstadter (New York: Harper Colophon, 1971), 46.
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physical engagement. By inventing depicted fictionalizations of the oncetransgressive moves of “advanced” modernist painting (the holes, dents,
scratches, adhered objects that characterize the work of certain modernist icons,
such as Lucio Fontana), Halvorson is in a sense allegorizing the avant-garde
abstract painting. Unlike a Fontana, Halvorson’s canvas is not only the primary
site of activity, but also the double of that site. We all know by rote that every
representational painting also functions as an arrangement of abstract marks;
not every representational painting, however, posits a fictional, historically
specific, “painting” so close, so parallel, to the picture plane. If the abstraction,
the surface-as-surface, of representational painting is challenged by the
nameability and recessive spatial position of the depicted, then in Halvorson’s
painting we are caught in an intellectual (non-spatial) plane that sits between the
abstract and the representational, or between matter and language, pointing at
both but unable to be either. And this act of painting is the act of fictionalizing,
an act that emphasizes a need for language, even if that language is always
subsumed into material. Ranciere describes a similar double movement in
“Painting in the Text”: “The ‘theatrical’ arrangement” (of figures) “establishes the
‘flatness’ of the painting only at the cost of making this surface an interface that
transfers the images into the text and the text into the images.”4
Strangely, by pinning us so close in between the real and the depicted but
denying us both, Halvorson creates a speculative space for the viewer. She is
providing the instigation for a fiction that is simultaneously open and closed,

4

Jacques Ranciere, The Future of The Image (London: Verso, 2007), 89.
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unbounded and bounded, a space where we project deeply, forwards and
backwards, but are left only with the image of our own projection.

Richard Aldrich

Untitled, 2006-2007

Throughout the history of painting in the West, the prevailing way for painters to
deal practically with their visual inheritance has been to utilize interpretative
copying, whereby an artist visually dissembles a specific piece by an artist of a
prior generation in order to understand what made the work effective. This
strategy serves as a tool of self-teaching in the service of the continuation and
advancement of a tradition. This has been largely replaced by the strategy of
appropriation, of the direct taking and using of a historicized artwork in the
service of commenting on its meaning as a sign.
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The question of how to deal with painting’s past is a difficult one in an age
when any sense of art historical progression has broken down, when it no longer
seems necessary to develop, or overthrow, the work of previous generations. In
his highly complex body of work, Richard Aldrich has attempted to find his own
personal strategy for negotiating the history of painting, the effect of which is
neither merely the development, or one-upping, of the visual grammar of a
specific work, nor an employment of the historical work as only a culturally
encoded sign, but rather an enrichment of a given art historical space through the
insertion of his own slight invention.
What could it mean that Aldrich, in his non-figurative work, uses
pointedly modernist (usually mid-twentieth century) art-historical languages,
making paintings that, by turn, emulate Abstract Expressionism, Art Informel,
Supports/Surfaces, Spatialism, etc., and that seem close to individual artists like
Serge Poliakoff or Joan Mitchell? His use of these styles and characters is further
complicated by his refusal to make direct comment on them. His paintings do
not critique the works they reference so much as set up shop in their art historical
context. There appears to be a disturbing lack of critical voice in the work, a
muteness that renders the work vulnerable to accusations of laziness or
generality, but which, coupled with convincingly specific, seemingly autonomous
images, might in fact supply the viewer enough leeway to create their own
historical situations around the work.
“Type” becomes an interesting concept in regard to Aldrich, for he is
making works that imply a style, a place, and a time, but that do not overtly
reference or appropriate actual works or the exact handwriting of a given artist.
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This places the viewer in the tricky situation of not knowing whether to read the
works as earnest, “authentic” statements or as quotations. If read strictly as
either, his work seems to fail. If the work is to be seen as “original” it would
appear to rest too comfortably within well- trodden visual tropes. On the other
hand, quotation is implied, but never completely accomplished. So Aldridge
seems to be operating within a narrow zone between the two—associating
himself with both approaches. He is allowing his work to be adjacent to known
quantities, partaking in their “type” and also remaining just distant enough to
imply divergent intent.
Aldrich’s painting, Untitled, from 2007-2008 is a particularly frustrating
example of this. The painting carries all of the signifiers of the “earned”
improvised abstraction espoused by Abstract Expressionists and Tachists, the
kind of painting that comes about through trial and error, through the distillation
of complex input into a succinct, yet felt, interplay between figure and ground.
The paint is applied in chalky blocks that interlock over all four quadrants of the
canvas, engaging the whole. The edges of the green-gray figure and the dirty
white ground carry a tension between determinate description and accident. One
can see through, at points along this border, to previous layers of paint. The
varied hues of these points suggest an under-layer that embodied the same
complex, adaptive, attunement as does the final layer. Yet, in spite of all these
reinforcing clues, we are left a bit incredulous as to the possibility of any real
belief in the importance of these choices on the part of the artist. Because we
don’t believe that this type of painting can, or should be, made today, we cannot
believe that he really believes in these ideas either. We also know that his work as
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a whole, although often coming back to this mid-century, expressionist aesthetic,
ranges widely and incorporates text, popular imagery, obscure autobiographical
references, and self-referential quotations from his own oeuvre. This knowledge
leaves us skeptical towards the work. Is this painting language being used only as
a look or style? And if this is true, for what purpose does he use it? Aldrich has
been quoted as calling his relationship to painting “a foothold between innocence
and understanding.”5 This implies the troubling notion that the invented
component in the work, that which is not already understood (i.e. already a
culturally embedded sign that exists as a known quantity to both artist and
viewer) is left open as “innocence,” the meaning therein being unexamined. The
possibility for articulated meaning must come then from the “between” space,
from the narrative implications the viewer can draw out through the idea of a
contemporary artist using the known meanings of a historical vocabulary, but
being “original” within those parameters. In this case, the historical vocabulary
he is using—mid-century gestural abstraction—has been codified as carrying
within it the trace of existential struggle, where each decision carries with it a
tremendous weight. Yet by allowing himself to use that language, Aldrich
transfers the meaning into one that has to do with opportunity instead of weighty
restriction, with historical play instead of progress.
This permission to slip into a historical role can be seen as both a
symptom of “knowingness” and a solution to the problem of knowingness.
Contemporary artists, and one might especially say, painters, have the problem of

5

Laura Fried, “On the Work of Richard Aldrich,” Contemporary Art Museum St. Louis.
http://www.camstl.org/exhibitions/main-gallery/richard-aldrich-and-the-19th-century-french-painting-/
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knowing too much. They are in a situation where every visual nuance carries
with it an art historical lineage and hence makes comment on that lineage, so
how those codes are used is of paramount importance. But in the precisely
evasive position Aldrich locates, he is able not just to use those codes, but actually
to inhabit, if only momentarily, an art historical space. One could conjecture that
the instance of one painting lets him become a fictional-historical figure, a
hypothetical artist. The interplay of time and cultural value becomes evident as
one speculates about this possible historical artistic practice, out of which only
one painting still exists, in comparison to the “real” contemporary artistic
practice of Richard Aldrich, which encompasses a plethora of painting languages
and references. One thinks about the imagined continuity in the practice of this
hypothetical modernist, in relation to a schizoid, if sophisticated, contemporary
practice. One also speculates about the possible effects of this work, had it been
actually made in the fifties or sixties. Its visual difference from the actual
painting of that time is so slight, one wonders if it would have made a difference
at all.
In the end, though, we are left with a remarkable displacement from actual
to possible, from a place of incredulity to a place of belief. This is accomplished
not in the way the painting looks so much as how the way it looks relates to its
contemporary context. The viewer is given the agency to re-narrate art history,
even if the ending always comes out the same.
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Joe Bradley

Mouth and Foot (Ichthus) 2010

Joe Bradley’s work seems to combine an acute sense of timing (in terms of
Kubler’s notion of “entrance”), with a deep commitment to inchoate, unresolved,
articulation. To some, this might translate as a combination of fashion and
expressionism. Where is the opposition in the work, they might well wonder.
What conceptual parameters have been supplied that we might read the work as a
critique of the heroic, gestural, painting it apes in style and scale? There appear
to be none. No framework or explanatory text is supplied. No text, that is,
besides the text of the work itself and of the artists’ prior work.
Bradley is a painter who creates distinct bodies of work, making large
jumps stylistically from one to the next. He first became known for his
monochrome stackings of stretched vinyl, which look to be sculptural, robot-like
figures. Next, he made a series of what he called “Schmagoo” paintings, which
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consist of simple, iconic, line drawings in grease pencil on dirty, poorly stretched,
unprimed canvas. The drawings depict, among other things, semi-realized stick
figures, the superman emblem, the number “23”, a horizontal line, and a blocky
cross. His latest two groups of work continue his preoccupation with the figure.
His 2010 show at Gavin Brown’s Enterprise, “Mouth and Foot Paintings” was
filled with giant-sized gestural paintings made with oil stick on scuffed, stretched
drop-cloth canvas. These combined recognizable body parts and symbols with
awkward, abstract shapes. His concurrent show “Human Form”, at Canada,
consisted of large silkscreened silhouettes of a man imitating what appear to be
poses from archaic Greek or ancient Egyptian painting, but were in fact sourced
from a break dancing manual. The gaps in-between the bodies of work seem to
inform our reading of the decisions inside each group. They act as cool, critical,
distancing agents. We are constantly reminded that what we are looking at is an
option, a chosen rhetorical voice.
The “Mouth and Foot Paintings” enter the visual territory of two of the
most heavily debunked twentieth century art movements—abstract
expressionism and neo expressionism. The paintings call to mind Pollock (if only
in his use of a raw support), Guston, Baselitz, and Basquiat, among others.
However, Bradley has a knack for making the unfashionable fashionable. The
similarity to the above mentioned artists proves to only be superficial, with
Bradley’s work never attempting the heroic, but merely using its signifiers to
underscore a faulty, awkward fragility (the artist’s actual influences, including
Don Van Vliet (Captain Beefheart), Chicago artists Jim Nutt and Roger Brown,
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and outsider artist Joseph Yoakum, are far more quirky and obscure).6 In any
case it is obvious that Bradley is consciously taking on the language of heroic,
monumental abstraction. By coupling that language with invented “primitivist”
pictograms, he creates a kind of self-negating expressionism that serves, in the
end, as a vehicle for an intimate exchange with the viewer on the communicative
efficacy of painting.
Mouth and Foot (Ichthus) gives us a rumination on the complexities of
articulation in painting in the guise of a decodable symbol. At the center of the
canvas we see a fish-shaped ichthys, an early Christian symbol for Jesus. The tail
of the fish has been attached by Bradley to a black fang in a schematically
rendered predatory mouth. This hybrid symbol was taken by Bradley from an
image in Philip K. Dick’s Exegesis, the science fiction author’s multi-volume
investigation of his personal spiritual visions.7 Bradley is here playing on our
human desire to decode and interpret, on the very idea of exegesis itself. Our
first impulse as viewers is towards decoding this drawing as symbol, forgetting
that this is not a symbol but a painting, an object. We think about evangelism,
consumption, corruption and decay (the black teeth); we read the symbol as a
mouth and an eye, and then think about viewership in regards to articulation. All
of these are valid readings, but they are only the first layer, literally. There is a
whole other painting behind the site of our primary decoding.
Like all of the paintings in its series, Mouth and Foot (Ichthus), was
painted on both sides. Working on the floor, the artist periodically flipped the

6
7

Phong Bui, “Joe Bradley with Phong Bui,” The Brooklyn Rail, February, 2011.
Ibid.
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canvas over to work on the other side, using the ghost image that bleeds through
the canvas as an impetus for further ideas. In most of the paintings, it seems as if
Bradley worked both sides at length, using similar painting languages on each
side and ending up with subtle remainders that hover behind and around the
positive forms on the front of the canvas. In this work, however, there is a leap in
language from back to front. He is giving us a stark comparison of two kinds of
language that can exist in painting: symbolic and abstract. He asks us to move
from one kind of thinking, of meaning creation, to another. Behind the “mouth,”
and behind the tooth of the canvas, a blocky cloud of blue, yellow and pink shapes
hovers. There is no apparent narrative relationship between the forms on either
side, so we are left as viewers to either decide that the background painting is
simply a sign of carelessness on the part of the artist—that he is using this canvas
as a support simply because its there—or that he is setting up a meditation on the
idea of both reading and looking.
Bradley has stated that he cannot conceive of painting a pure abstraction,
as he says: “I hold onto the body because I just can't make an abstract painting.
There's just always a story that I have to make happen.”8 So, one way to view
Mouth and Foot (Ichthus) is as a covering-up of abstraction with representation
(albeit a rudimentary form of representation). I would argue, however, that there
is a more sophisticated dynamic at work here, one that enacts a contradiction at
the heart of how painting functions. Bradley is pursuing the matter from two
sides, moving inward. Both abstract and representational images are physically
seeping towards each other through the weave of the canvas, placing the action of
8

Yasha Wallin, “Cave Painter: Joe Bradley,” Art in America, January, 2011.
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the painting on that weave, that is to say, on the objecthood, the materiality of the
canvas itself. This is the physical reality—or, one could say, objective truth—of
the dynamic of the painting. However, the perceptual reality of the painting,
because of its two-sidedness, is the temporary vanishing of that object of the
canvas into a transparent pane. This illusion of disappearance is made all the
more poignant because of the nastiness of the surface, its simultaneous assertion
as beaten-up, earthy, material.
Bradley pulls painting apart here, leaving us finally with the original
“window”, the object-negating, transparent, illusory reality of painting. But it is
found in a most unlikely place in this seemingly bawdy, assertive, expressive
object.

On Raphael Rubinstein’s “Provisional Painting”
There have been few critics who have attempted to make sense of the recent trend
in painting towards reduction and self-effacement. One who has tried is Raphael
Rubinstein. In his May 2009 Art in America article, “Provisional Painting,”
Rubinstein casts a wide net in order to identify the terms he needs to describe
this strain in painting. Focusing on the lack of “finish” in the painting he
addresses as testament to the “impossibility” inherent in all painting, Rubinstein
creates an argument that seems to only be able to identify the effects of
“provisionality,” but not the reasons for it. 9 Moreover, he seems to be able to go
no further than to accept these effects, this “look,” at face value. In claiming that
9

Raphael Rubinstein, “Provisional Painting,” Art in America, May, 2009
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the provisional painting is “the finished product disguised as a preliminary stage,
or a body double standing in for a star/masterpiece whose value would put a stop
to artistic risk,”10he correctly identifies the incompleteness of the work as a guise,
but does not analyze what the underlying “finished” work might be or might do.
The term, “provisional” is used by Rubinstein to talk about a lack of any
permanent resolution or final statement in a painting. He asks the question,
“Why would an artist demur at the prospect of a finished work, court selfsabotaging strategies, sign his or her name to a painting that looks, from some
perspectives, like an utter failure?”11 But, as Rubinstein himself acknowledges,
the appearance of casualness, incompleteness, or erasure is nothing new in
painting. The author traces a “foundational skepticism” in modernism back to
the perceptual second-guessing of Cezanne and Giacometti, as well as the
“denunciations of Dada” up through (confusingly) to Polke and Punk rock.12 In
this sense, Rubinstein seems to think that the gesture of erasure or nullification
means the same thing now as it did in 1900, 1954, 1920, 1965, or 1978. The
reality is that at any given point in time it meant something different. To claim
the contemporary “unfinished” work as radical assumes accepted notions of
“finish” that no longer exist. The painter working today who chooses to leave a
canvas mostly empty or rubbed-out does not do so in the face of an academy or
audience which requires a high level of pictorial resolution or an earnest battle
with the medium. He or she is not risking failure based on the look of the canvas.
Rather, the affront is in the lack of ownership over a personalized critical
10
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statement—it lies in the meta-text rather than in the text. But Rubinstein stays
doggedly in the realm of the visual when speculating on issues of abjection and
negation, thus possibly ignoring the real sites of both.
Rubinstein goes on to speculate that the impetus for making provisional
works now lies in a rebellion against slickness and marketability: “As employed
by younger artists, provisionality may also be an attempt to spurn the
blandishments of the art market—what seemed, until only yesterday, an
insatiable appetite for smart, stylish, immaculately executed canvases, paintings
that left no doubt as to the artist’s technical competence, refined sensibility and
solid work ethic.”13 What this argument fails to take into account is that there is
more than one style of painting which whets the appetites of collectors. A piece
of frayed, wrinkled, cloth stuck to a canvas can be fetishized as easily as a slick,
clean, painting can. Indeed, the dandyism implied by the nonchalant, one-off,
gesture is itself a marketable commodity. Some collectors may want to be in on
the combination of disregard and sophistication that such a work might evoke.
Rubinstein himself appears to have an underlying admiration for a certain
attitude in the works he discusses, an admiration that one could easily see
translating to the market. If there is a visual language that can truly run counter
to the forces of the market, it is not to be found in the gestures of erasure and
nullification that Rubinstein talks about. This is not to say that there isn’t a
concerted effort on the part of many of the artists discussed in this article to
withhold an immediately generous and attractive first layer from the viewer. This
strategy exists. But it seems implausible to ascribe to these artists the intention
13
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of resistance to market forces where there really is none. The works by the
“younger artists” (such as Stefan Sandner, Richard Aldrich, Cheryl Donegan,
Jacqueline Humphries, Wendy White, and Joe Bradley) mentioned in the article
function very well within the market. This statement by Rubinstein is probably
an attempt to give the work some kind of anti-capitalist credibility. In reality, if
there can be seen to be any such critique in this work, it comes from the work’s
participation in the economy of the art world. That such anti-work is consumed
readily might be itself very telling about what the actual purchased thing is—the
artist instead of the artwork.
The bulk of Rubinstein’s article is given over to description of the five mid
and late career artists he chooses to typify the idea of “provisional painting.” For
each, the author focuses on the ways in which the given artist is operating in an
anti-heroic, minor manner. One is left to guess how this might function as a
positive. In writing about Raoul de Keyser, Rubinstein uses such words as
“amateur” and “novice” to describe the appearance of the work of the eighty-one
year old painter. Albert Oehlen’s paintings are described in their “abject
awkwardness” (you are told that this gives the work “great pictorial force,” but
you are not told how). Mary Heilmann’s work is “self contained and
unassuming” and “doesn’t seem to invite any transcendent reading.”14 Michael
Krebber even fails, in Rubinstein’s eyes, to do enough to be provisional painter,
he is “an artist failing to achieve nonfinito vitality out of sheer impatience.”
Rubenstein comes closest to questioning his own admiration for negation in his
examination of Christopher Wool’s work, about which he asks the question: “has
14
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anything actually been covered up? Is there something under Wool’s erasures?”
This is the central question which any work that forefronts negation asks—is
there anything there to be negated? Is there a real content, a hidden presence,
underneath the obfuscations, erasures, and failures?15
The crux of the article rests on the idea of “impossibility,” the notion that
certain constrictions conspire to prohibit the production of paintings. He sees his
anti-heroic, provisional painting as being made against this dramatic
background. He puts it this way: “Impossibility can also be the result of the
artist making excessive demands on the work, demands to which current practice
has no reply. At a certain moment, in a certain studio, it appears that great
painting may be impossible, that painting of any kind may be impossible.
Nonetheless, for whatever reasons pertaining to a particular painter at a
particular time, painting must be done, must go on.” So, near the end of his
article—which up until then had taken pains to avoid associating any kind of
valor or effort with the artists he describes—Rubinstein suddenly frames his
argument in existentialist terms. He sounds somewhat like Philip Guston, who
said of New York School painting: “…you felt as if you were driven into a corner,
against a wall with no place to stand...it was as if you had to prove to yourself that
truly the act of creation was still possible…I felt as if I was talking to myself,
having a dialectical argument with myself to see if I could create.”16 Yet, again,
Rubinstein fails to take history into account. Just as the relationship of a
contemporary painter to ideas of negation and erasure cannot possibly be the
15
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same as an artist working thirty, forty, or fifty years ago, so, too, the relationship
of that artist to the notion of impossibility must also be fundamentally different.
For Guston, impossibility was something that had to be discovered through
painting and then overcome in painting. Although one could say that these
existentialist attitudes were something that was also absorbed culturally, it was
important for him to think of his “battle” with impossibility as uniquely his own
and something that was found, discovered. Underneath all the anti-heroic
rhetoric, Rubinstein is trying to posit some kind of return to this struggle. But for
a painter working today, there is an a priori impossibility. It is a given that
painting has no special right to exist and should have no privileged position vis à
vis other things in the world. This does not need to be enacted, worked out on
the canvas. It would not make sense to create a kind of double negative—a
painting which announces its impossibility within a context where its
impossibility is accepted. Yet the use of erasure as an emptied-out gesture (think
Christopher Wool), is also a given strategy. So young painters taking on this
territory today work within a language where defacement/erasure and positive
marking carry no inherently negative or positive values. This points to an
emptiness, a silence, which is greater than the mere look of the painting. It is the
silence of the artist’s voice. This is the truly troubling phenomenon which
Rubinstein points to, but does not fully identify.
We should not forget, however, that viewer has agency in this dynamic. It
is up to the viewer to read these paintings as empty. But, given our historical
position, might we not read them as full, as possibly overloaded with
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information? Might the work be pointing towards this? Might it be the viewer’s
ability to switch between the two readings which animates the work?

On Christopher K. Ho’s Hirsch E.P. Rothko’s Hirsch E.P. Rothko

Christopher K. Ho has posited a different and more complex way of addressing
this new current in painting through a fiction he has developed surrounding an
alter-ego, “Hirsch E.P. Rothko.” The form this has taken is a novella entitled
Hirsch E.P. Rothko’s Hirsch E.P. Rothko. In it, Ho seeks to position new abstract
painting within a larger framework, or rather, he seeks to talk about what he sees
as its non-criticality within a critical model. The fiction he creates serves to allow
him to make this kind of work himself, as the novella is only one of three
components of his 2010 solo exhibition at Winkleman gallery, entitled “Regional
Painting.” The other two were License Plate Shed, described by Ho as “Part
endurance art, part polemic, part experiment”17 and which consisted of him living
and working in a shed in a remote location for one year, and Untitled Paintings
by Hirsch E.P. Rothko 2001 / Christopher K. Ho, which is comprised of the
paintings he made over the course of that year. The central question of this entire
project is how an “uncritical” stance might be used as part of a critique. In asking
this question, Ho takes it as a given that painting, and more pointedly, small,
hand-made, invented, abstract painting, is created in rejection of critical
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discourse. The meta-text Ho creates is a way of redeeming this painting from
itself, while using it as a kind of proposal, or option.
Even as Ho centers this project around the activity of painting, he takes
great pains to keep one foot outside of this activity. He wants to make sure that
we know that a painting is not enough on its own, even as his fictional character,
Rothko, moves from a worn-out conceptualist practice towards a new
engagement with the autonomous painted surface. Ho uses painting as a
caricature, a stand-in for a kind of anti-conceptualism, and yet he (possibly as a
reflection of his sentiments about his own work) also characterizes (if not
caricatures) conceptual practice as a kind of trap. Ho writes, in the voice of
Rothko, that “the anguished branching logic of my conceptual practice, a logic in
which every decision revealed another set of decisions to be made, each bearing
its own set of possible consequences (critical, art historical, aesthetic,
commercial, social), all of which had to be considered and reconsidered before
the next could be addressed. Needless to say, nothing got done. My studio days
would end as all of this suddenly collapsed into an empty core that seemed
ultimately to underpin simple choices of materials, fabricators, configurations of
elements in exhibition spaces.”18
Rothko comes to painting, then, as an antidote to hyperintellectualization. His first impulse to use paint comes from seeing excrement
on the walls of a restroom, which makes him “think of paint.” Ho thus links the
impulse to paint to some sort of infantile, scatological fascination with material.
Other figures of anti-intellectualism come in to play as the story progresses, and
18
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the trajectory of Rothko’s journey is towards an anti-intellectual space. After
Rothko abandons the New York art world (having been fired from his teaching
job at RISD and having told an important gallerist “I did that,” in regards to the
aforementioned excrement) he winds up driving through Colorado, where he
crashes his car. The damage is minor, but the hyperbolic New Yorker thinks of
himself as being saved by a bunch of locals. Ho humorously references Joseph
Beuys, hippie culture, ski culture, Native Americans, and pop spirituality in his
description of his rescue: “The crushed corpse of my plane. The snow. Parched,
cold, buried, certain death, hunger. A double rainbow. Ute Indians. A wooden
man, burning. War paint, Kjus suits. The smell of pot. Being dragged, the sound
of unfamiliar tongues disorienting as I was wrapped in felt blankets. Warmth. I
was saved.”19 This sets up an atmosphere of (easily consumed) myth, rather than
analysis and critique. It is this local milieu becomes the antithesis of his New
York environment. The locals quickly identify Rothko’s problems as being of a
spiritual nature. Rothko’s first reaction, meanwhile, is to pass judgment on these
people. Ho uses their lifestyle as an allegory for an unspoken “painter” straw
man he sets up. They “approached their lives without any critical apparatus,
without self-awareness, without rigor. They perceived themselves as free, their
courses self-determined, living outside of the constraints of “society.” Of course,
in my view they were society’s pure products, their form of put-on resistance
precisely that expected of them by a culture that commodified dissent.”20 (As a
sidebar to this characterization and critique of the “free-spirit”, Ho makes sure to
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drop hints that his new friends are in fact indirectly subsidized, through the stock
portfolio of one of their members, by such dubious entities as Raytheon and
Halliburton, thereby alluding to painting’s dependency on the market and
corporate money.) This all points to Ho setting up the idea of naïve intuition that
needs to be redeemed by a conceptual model. As Rothko moves unwittingly
towards direct, “intuitive” painting, Ho slyly pulls the rug out from under that
way of making in the subtext of the fiction.
But Ho’s intention in this fiction does not seem be to just make a veiled
criticism of intuitive painting. Rather, he is suggesting the idea of “Regional
Painting” as a “temporary suspension”21 of criticality which allows one to escape
circular logic and ideas of historical progression. Ho calls this a “side-guard”22
position in which the artist is freed from both the claims of history, of “newness,”
and the stigma of conservatism. For Ho to accept the intuitive as a strategy, it
must exist in a dualistic relationship with criticality. But this separation leaves
his actual appraisal of what constitutes the process of painting terribly
impoverished and simple-minded. In taking critical awareness out of the actual
process, Ho leaves us with a stereotype. When Rothko finally begins painting in
the shed, his narrative voice spews the most inane aphorisms about painting,
such as, “The painting speaks to you; you listen and react. It wants to be found,
not made. Painting is a forum for accidents; these must never be faked. Honesty
is paramount. Planning is inherently dishonest,” and, “When you are truly
painting, you will be discovering what you already know without knowing that
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you know it.” This description is problematic for several reasons. It assumes, fist
of all, that abstract painters today employ what are essentially Abstract
Expressionist methods, albeit a highly simplistic version of those methods. This
may be true for some truly “regionalist” painters. But the kind of painting Ho is
responding to in taking on this project is far more deceptive than he wants to give
it credit for. Ho writes as if surface “look” were reliable, as if the younger
generation of painters whose work he is attracted to and yet suspicious of don’t
understand the cultural signifiers they are employing in making these paintings.
The difference between Ho and these painters (some of whom I’ve written about
in this paper) is the difference between overt and implied fiction. Rothko, for Ho,
is an explicitly fictional character that allows him to act out his imagined opposite
(“Scratch a conceptual artist, find a painter.”) 23 The kind of painting I’ve been
discussing, on the other hand, employs an embedded fiction, and allows the artist
to play more subtly with cultural and historical meaning instead of using
stereotype and caricature. The separation between an over-arching critical
argument and the work itself is a handy one that allows Ho to have it both ways.
In doing so he declares painting’s impotency to carry embedded critique, to
function fully as a discursive site. Thus, even as Ho proposes “regionalism” as an
option, we know that his project is in fact a criticism of the implicit, the unsaid.
In the architecture of his project, what he in fact proposes is the primacy of an
overt authoritative voice. For Ho, even if that voice exists behind the foil of a
character, it is never in question.
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*

*

The real problem in this new painting is its critical silence. Its possible
inscrutability comes from a lack of credible clues that could give us as viewers
enough traction to read the intention and discursive stance of the artist. The
relationship of the physical work to language is unclear, as we are in many cases
not provided with a “project” whose terms are well-defined and which provides a
lens through which we view the work. This painting is not, I would say, being
made despite the lack of an overt conceptual model, but rather is being made
about and with that lack. This absence looms very large, it hovers over the work
and prods the viewer, chafing against the commonly held notion of art as a
rhetorical device, a tool of communication.
By way of minimalism and post-minimalism, we are accustomed (as
viewers of painting) to working with blankness, to squeezing out the most
meaning from the least input, creating more for ourselves to see where there is
less. What allowed us to do this in the past was an idea of progression, a notion
of how the work we were viewing added to the lineage and vocabulary of painting.
We are faced now with a new kind of emptiness, one that doubles physical
reduction with an absence of any conventional sense of progress. Locating a noman’s land between historical reference and invention, these artists mine the past
but do so peripherally. They do not so much reassert past solutions, acting out
some kind of historical cycle, as they create fictional artworks that move freely
back and forth between a present context and a historical language. In the past,
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the framework given by historical prescription and the artist’s own agenda
informed the reading of the physical object. This is still the case, of course. But
there is now this added, historically fictive, dimension in painting. These works
opt for movement, for perambulation, instead of progress. Art historical spaces
are shifted, filled-out, and enriched by fictional additions. The historical
imagination of the viewer becomes one site of the work, as the viewer attempts to
create a framework for the work based on the given physical material.
The relationship between material presence and an absent framework is
especially complex and interesting in the age of high speed internet, powerful
search engines, and open-source software. In an age of light speed accessibility
to layer upon layer of reference, why would artist opt to put forward work that
asserts itself as un-critically self-referential? Why this muteness now? The
apparent lack of a single authoritative agenda in the works addressed here might
reflect an open-source approach to art making and critique. Each artist adds a
slight variation to a text, changing a word or sentence here or there instead of
writing a manifesto. This conclusion, although interesting, leads nowhere and
enables countless pointless variations on the abject, negated, painting. But those
artists that can goad this active viewership while supplying a complex,
emotionally fertile ground for the viewer’s creative activity and effectively embed
the parameters of a critical fiction in the material will set themselves apart. In
the end, the artist’ voice is not absent, but it is necessarily tested by absence.
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